Daily Papers

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

Deontic reasoning is the task of answering questions by applying explicit rules and policies to case-specific facts, for example computing tax liability under a statute or determining the outcome of an immigration appeal. A key technical challenge for LLM-based deontic reasoning is that the relevant ruleset can be long and cross-referenced, so models may still fail to locate the rules needed for a particular reasoning step. We introduce Deontic Agentic Reasoning (DAR), an agentic reasoning setup in which the model interacts with the statutes on demand. We evaluate DAR under multiple harnesses on hard subsets of DeonticBench. Across these settings, we find that agentic harnesses can push the frontier on deontic reasoning tasks, but improvements are not uniform: weaker models often degrade on numerical tasks while consuming far more tokens.

Reasoning with complex, context-specific rules remains challenging for large language models (LLMs). In legal and policy settings, this manifests as deontic reasoning: reasoning about obligations, permissions, and prohibitions under explicit rules. While many recent benchmarks emphasize short-context mathematical reasoning, fewer focus on long-context, high-stakes deontic reasoning. To address this gap, we introduce DEONTICBENCH, a benchmark of 6,232 tasks across U.S. federal taxes, airline baggage policies, U.S. immigration administration, and U.S. state housing law. These tasks can be approached in multiple ways, including direct reasoning in language or with the aid of symbolic computation. Besides free-form chain-of-thought reasoning, DEONTICBENCH enables an optional solver-based workflow in which models translate statutes and case facts into executable Prolog, leading to formal problem interpretations and an explicit program trace. We release reference Prolog programs for all instances. Across frontier LLMs and coding models, best hard-subset performance reaches only 44.4% on SARA Numeric and 46.6 macro-F1 on Housing. We further study training with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning for symbolic program generation. Although training improves Prolog generation quality, current RL methods still fail to solve these tasks reliably. Overall, DEONTICBENCH provides a benchmark for studying context-grounded rule reasoning in real-world domains under both symbolic and non-symbolic settings.

Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative ethics through the lens of computational complexity. First, we introduce computational complexity for the uninitiated reader and discuss how the complexity of ethical problems can be framed within Marr's three levels of analysis. We then study a range of ethical problems based on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, with the aim of elucidating the complexity associated with the problems themselves (e.g., due to combinatorics, uncertainty, strategic dynamics), the computational methods employed (e.g., probability, logic, learning), and the available resources (e.g., time, knowledge, learning). The results indicate that most problems the normative frameworks pose lead to tractability issues in every category analyzed. Our investigation also provides several insights about the computational nature of normative ethics, including the differences between rule- and outcome-based moral strategies, and the implementation-variance with regard to moral resources. We then discuss the consequences complexity results have for the prospect of moral machines in virtue of the trade-off between optimality and efficiency. Finally, we elucidate how computational complexity can be used to inform both philosophical and cognitive-psychological research on human morality by advancing the Moral Tractability Thesis (MTT).

Repository-level code comprehension and knowledge sharing remain core challenges in software engineering. Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise by generating explanations of program structure and logic. However, these approaches still face limitations: First, relevant knowledge is distributed across multiple files within a repository, aka semantic fragmentation. Second, retrieval inefficiency and attention saturation degrade performance in RAG pipelines, where long, unaligned contexts overwhelm attention. Third, repository specific training data is scarce and often outdated. Finally, proprietary LLMs hinder industrial adoption due to privacy and deployment constraints. To address these issues, we propose Key-Augmented Neural Triggers (KANT), a novel approach that embeds knowledge anchors into both training and inference. Unlike prior methods, KANT enables internal access to repository specific knowledge, reducing fragmentation and grounding inference in localized context. Moreover, we synthesize specialized data directly from code. At inference, knowledge anchors replace verbose context, reducing token overhead and latency while supporting efficient, on premise deployment. We evaluate KANT via: a qualitative human evaluation of the synthesized dataset's intent coverage and quality across five dimensions; compare against SOTA baselines across five qualitative dimensions and inference speed; and replication across different LLMs to assess generalizability. Results show that the synthetic training data aligned with information-seeking needs. KANT achieved over 60% preference from human annotators and a LocalStack expert (preferring 79% of cases). Also, KANT reduced inference latency by up to 85% across all models. Overall, it is well-suited for scalable, low-latency, on-premise deployments, providing a strong foundation for code comprehension.

Ethical reasoning is a crucial skill for Large Language Models (LLMs). However, moral values are not universal, but rather influenced by language and culture. This paper explores how three prominent LLMs -- GPT-4, ChatGPT, and Llama2-70B-Chat -- perform ethical reasoning in different languages and if their moral judgement depend on the language in which they are prompted. We extend the study of ethical reasoning of LLMs by Rao et al. (2023) to a multilingual setup following their framework of probing LLMs with ethical dilemmas and policies from three branches of normative ethics: deontology, virtue, and consequentialism. We experiment with six languages: English, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, Hindi, and Swahili. We find that GPT-4 is the most consistent and unbiased ethical reasoner across languages, while ChatGPT and Llama2-70B-Chat show significant moral value bias when we move to languages other than English. Interestingly, the nature of this bias significantly vary across languages for all LLMs, including GPT-4.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

Artificial writing is permeating our lives due to recent advances in large-scale, transformer-based language models (LMs) such as BERT, its variants, GPT-2/3, and others. Using them as pre-trained models and fine-tuning them for specific tasks, researchers have extended state of the art for many NLP tasks and shown that they capture not only linguistic knowledge but also retain general knowledge implicitly present in the data. Unfortunately, LMs trained on unfiltered text corpora suffer from degenerated and biased behaviour. While this is well established, we show that recent LMs also contain human-like biases of what is right and wrong to do, some form of ethical and moral norms of the society -- they bring a "moral direction" to surface. That is, we show that these norms can be captured geometrically by a direction, which can be computed, e.g., by a PCA, in the embedding space, reflecting well the agreement of phrases to social norms implicitly expressed in the training texts and providing a path for attenuating or even preventing toxic degeneration in LMs. Being able to rate the (non-)normativity of arbitrary phrases without explicitly training the LM for this task, we demonstrate the capabilities of the "moral direction" for guiding (even other) LMs towards producing normative text and showcase it on RealToxicityPrompts testbed, preventing the neural toxic degeneration in GPT-2.